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On 15 December in Kyiv, the Orthodox Church General Council of the Metropolis of Kyiv, 
which is subordinate to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, was convened. The 
attendees approved the statute presented by the Ecumenical Patriarch, and elected Metro-
politan Epiphanius (bishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarchate, UOC-KP) to be 
its superior. Epiphanius will be granted the tomos, giving the Metropolis of Kyiv autocephaly 
(canonical independence), in Istanbul on 6 January 2019. The newly founded church will be 
called the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, thus commencing the process of unification of the 
church structures of three Ukrainian orthodox churches: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv 
Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), and the Ukrainian Ortho-
dox Church (UOC), which recognises the primacy of the Moscow Patriarch. For the moment 
the number of priests and faithful of the Patriarch of Moscow that will move to the new Me-
tropolis of Kyiv is not clear. The convening of the general council and election of the superior 
of the united church will not necessarily bring to an end the split within Ukrainian orthodoxy. 
This is merely the beginning of a complicated process that could trigger a series of conflicts 
within Ukraine and in Ukrainian-Russian relations.
The convening of the Kyiv council is a success for Petro Poroshenko, who agreed the grant-
ing of the tomos last spring with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew in person. This will be 
a success actively exploited for the purpose of the presidential election campaign (31 March 
2019), but does not guarantee that he will go through to the second round, let alone achieve 
ultimate victory. 
Kyiv unification council
According to a decision made by the Ecumen-
ical Patriarchate Council on 11 October this 
year, the Metropolis of Kyiv (founded in the 11th 
century, under the Moscow Patriarchate since 
the XVII century) was restored and returned to 
the jurisdiction of Constantinople, but at that 
time was still not given autocephaly1. For the 
1	 T.	 Olszański,	 ‘The	 Ecumenical	 Patriarchate	 recognises	
the independence of the Orthodox metropolis of Kiev’, 
OSW Analysis, 17.10.2018, https://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2018-10-12/ecumenical-patriar-
chate-recognises-independence-orthodox-metropolis 
Ukrainian	 church	 to	 be	 granted	 autocephaly,	
the	 unification	 council	 had	 to	 be	 convened. 
It was attended by representatives of all three 
churches: all of the KP UOC and UAOC bishops 
(42 from the KP UOC and 12 from the UAOC) 
and 2 bishops from the UOC (out of 73 current 
active bishops)2. Each of the bishops was ac-
companied by one representative of the parish 
2 The UOC has 52 dioceses and 12,000 parishes, the UOC-
KP – 35 dioceses and 5,000 parishes, while the UAOC 
has 14 dioceses and one thousand parishes. Релігія 
і Церква в українському суспільстві: соціологічне 
дослідження-2018; 25.04.2018, http://razumkov.org.ua/
uploads/article/2018_Religiya.pdf. Numbers of faithful 
vary and are not very reliable.
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clergy	and	monks	or	 laypersons.	 The	meeting	
was jointly chaired in effect by the exarchate 
(delegate) of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and 
the	 President	 of	 Ukraine.	 This	 system,	 known	
as	the	 ‘general	council’,	 ranks	higher	than	the	
synod of bishops. Of the bishops of the UOC, 
it was attended by Metropolitan Simeon of 
Vinnytsia and Bar and Metropolitan Alexander 
of	 Pereyaslav-Khmelnytsky	 and	 Vyshneve, the 
principal advocate of autocephaly in the UOC. 
It was not attended by Metropolitan Sophroni-
us	of	Cherkasy	and	Kaniv,	who	even	last	spring	
actively lobbied for autocephaly (due to the fact 
that he is 78 years old, the explanation that he 
was absent for reasons relating to health would 
seem plausible). The lower number of UOC bish-
ops than expected (according to media reports, 
last spring a letter to Patriarch Bartholomew 
regarding the granting of autocephaly to the 
Ukrainian	church	was	signed	by	10	bishops	of	
the structure) is due to pressure successfully 
being applied by Moscow and the continually 
high level of mistrust of the KP UOC. 
The	council	meeting	proceeded	efficiently	and	
only lasted a few hours. Bishops, priests, and 
laypersons approved the metropolitan stat-
ute and elected the superior, whose title will 
be	Metropolitan	 of	 Kyiv	 and	 All-Ukraine.	 The	
person elected was Metropolitan Epiphanius 
(see biography attached), who is just under 40 
years old, viceroy of Patriarch Filaret, de facto 
the person in charge of the KP UOC since 2013 
(the Patriarch, almost 90 years old, remains the 
spiritual leader). The council met in the most 
sacred	 venue	 in	 Ukraine	 –	 in	 the	 grand	 nave 
of the Kyiv Cathedral of St. Sophia (the Wisdom 
of God), built at the beginning of the XI century 
at	the	foot	of	mosaics	dating	back	to	the	time	
of construction, showing the Holy Mother of 
God as Orans. For centuries, the mosaics have 
been	known	as	the	‘Impenetrable	Wall’	and	are	
considered a symbol and guarantee of the sur-
vival	of	Ukraine.	The	tomos, which establishes 
autocephaly of the Metropolis of Kyiv, was not 
granted to the superior at the end of the council 
meeting,	but	this	is	to	take	place	on	6	January	
2019,	on	Christmas	Eve	in	the	Julian	calendar,	in	
Istanbul. As the meeting of the Kyiv council was 
concluded successfully, this will be a formality. 
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church
The	new	church	 is	 to	be	called	 the	 ‘Orthodox	
Church	 in	Ukraine’	 (this	 is	 the	 form	of	 names	
of	 autocephalic	 orthodox	 churches	 in	 Greek),	
while	in	Ukraine	the	form	‘Ukrainian	Orthodox	
Church’ (Prawosławna Cerkwa Ukrajiny, PCU) 
will be used. Initially, it will be possible to use 
phrases	 that	do	not	 confirm	 to	a	 single	 style,	
especially	 containing	 the	words	 ‘autocephalic’	
or	‘pomisna’	(particular).	Contrary	to	common	
expectations,	 in	 Ukraine	 the	Ukrainian	United	
Orthodox Church was not given the status of 
patriarchate, but metropolis. Some commen-
tators believe that the patriarchate will be the 
next	step	in	the	process	of	Ukraine	gaining	ec-
clesial independence, but this does not seem 
very probable. This is not only because of the 
self-proclamation of the Kyiv Patriarchate in 
1992 (without reference to the Ecumenical Pa-
triarchate and other autocephalic churches) but 
also because modern Orthodoxy does not cre-
ate new patriarchates3. Moreover, the Ecumeni-
cal Patriarch does not wish to antagonise other 
Particular Churches. It is possible however that 
the Metropolis of Kyiv could be elevated to the 
status of patriarchate in the future, but this will 
depend	on	how	the	process	of	uniting	Ukraini-
an orthodoxy proceeds.
The elderly Filaret, whose ninetieth birthday 
on	23	January	2019	has	been	registered	by	the 
Supreme Council as a state ceremony, was 
3 The last was appointed in 1925, for Romania, while the 
Bulgaria patriarchate proclaimed in 1955 was a return to 
the Bulgarian church structure of the middle ages.
All of the KP UOC and UAOC bishops, 
and only two out of the 73 UOC bishops, 
attended the council meeting.
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awarded the lifelong title of honourable pa-
triarch	by	the	council.	He	intended	to	seek	the	
position of superior of the new church but re-
linquished the plan when it was explicitly for-
bidden by Patriarch Bartholomew (the superior 
of the UAOC, Metropolitan Macarius, revealed 
that he was also forbidden from doing this) and 
probably conceded in return for the council’s 
support for the candidature of Metropolitan 
Epiphanius.
Future	Kyiv	metropolitans	will	not	be	confirmed	
by the Ecumenical Patriarch in any form, and 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate will also have no 
influence	over	the	forming	of	the	synod	super-
vising	the	work	of	the	metropolis.	On	the	other	
hand, the Kyiv Metropolis statute drawn up in 
Istanbul provides for a solution that has never 
been	seen	in	Ukraine	before:	the	synod	is	to	be	
made up of 12 bishops elected for terms of one 
year, while half of the members will be replaced 
semi-annually (the institution of permanent 
members of the synod has been abolished). This 
is a revolution in management of the church, 
and will be poorly received by many, while at 
the	same	time	it	will	help	to	make	the	structure	
more democratic. The only forms in which the 
Kyiv Metropolis will remain dependent will be 
with regard to receipt of myrrh, which it will re-
ceive from Istanbul and not prepare on its own, 
and an obligation to consult the Phanar on can-
onisation. The former is a purely liturgical issue, 
and the latter probably practical: Patriarchate 
or Constantinople can object to certain candi-
dates, and thus intervene in UOC canonisation 
policy (the canonisation procedure is not as for-
malised in the Eastern Church as in the Catholic 
Church).
Poroshenko’s pre-election manoeuvring
The	President	of	Ukraine	was	not	only	present	at	
the council meeting (on the presidium alongside 
the representative of the Ecumenical Patriarch) 
but he also made a speech at the beginning of 
the proceedings, whereby he informally became 
the	joint	chair.	On	16	December,	meanwhile,	at	
a press conference, he revealed that in the days 
leading up to the council meeting he mediated 
personally	 in	 numerous	 disputes	 and	 conflicts	
between representatives of the churches. When 
the proceedings were concluded, President Po-
roshenko	came	out	together	with	the	new	Met-
ropolitan on to the square in front of the Cathe-
dral of St. Sophia, where a patriotic and religious 
convention attended by several thousand peo-
ple, chaired by Minister of Culture, Yevhen Ny-
schuk,	had	been	going	on	since	morning.	Once	
the minister had formally presented Metropoli-
tan	Epiphanius,	Poroshenko	gave	a	speech.	This	
procedure resembled the investiture of a bishop 
by monarch in the middle ages, a gesture that 
blatantly disregarded the division of church and 
state.	In	his	speech,	the	President	of	Ukraine	said	
on the one hand that he did not intend to create 
a state church, but on the other he suggested 
a special relationship between the state and the 
new Church that was in the process of being 
created, and announced that the state would 
protect the rights of those who wished to move 
from the UOC to the autocephalous church. In 
practice this will be intervention in matters of 
religion, and in fact the state will have no alter-
native	–	the	Ukrainian	state	authorities	retain	the	
ownership rights to the churches and other reli-
gious premises. 
President	Poroshenko	stated	that	he	considered	
the	granting	of	autocephaly	the	‘final	winning	
of independence’ and the autocephalous me-
tropolis	to	be	a	‘Putin-free	church’.	Poroshenko	
wishes to be recorded in history as the person 
who saved the country from Russian aggression 
and	finalised	the	process	of	Ukrainian	emanci-
pation, severing not only political, but also reli-
gious ties with Russia. 
When Poroshenko delivered his speech as 
the council meeting ended, he announced 
that the state would protect the rights of 
those who wished to move to the auto-
cephalous church.
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Poroshenko’s	involvement	in	the	Ukrainian	au-
tocephaly is not only an attempt to gain a place 
in history. First and foremost, it is an attempt 
at re-election. Clearly, the initiative launched 
in the spring was designed to regain popular-
ity among the public (his support in the polls 
currently stands at around 11%) and secure 
electoral victory. This is one area in which he 
cannot	be	attacked	by	any	of	his	opponents	in	
the patriotic camp (his main rival political, Yulia 
Tymoshenko,	 is	strongly	 in	favour	of	this	deci-
sion).	Poroshenko’s	current	 ratings	suggest	he	
would not go through to a second round, and 
to	make	up	the	losses	he	needs	a	significantly	
more substantial success. It is even possible that 
Poroshenko	will	decide	not	to	run	(he	suggest-
ed	this	at	a	press	conference	on	16	December).	
On the other hand, the part he played in bring-
ing about autocephaly4, and in particular his 
speech	of	15	December,	demonstrate	that	more	
than	next	year’s	elections	are	at	stake	–	also	at	
stake	is	a	position	that	in	the	event	of	defeat	(or	
withdrawal from confrontation) will enable him 
to return to politics after a certain period of 
time	or	in	some	other	capacity.	Also	at	stake	is 
a	 place	 among	 Ukraine’s	 ‘independence	 fa-
thers’.	During	the	inauguration	eucharistic	litur-
gy,	Metropolitan	Epiphanius	officially	 thanked	
President	Poroshenko,	saying	that	it	would	not	
have been possible to obtain autocephaly had 
President	Poroshenko	not	been	involved.
Prospects for the new church
The outcome of the council meeting means 
that	 a	 new	 situation	 has	 arisen	 in	 Ukrainian	
orthodoxy, but does not amount to a solution 
that overcomes the current split. This is only the 
beginning of a process that will be fraught with 
difficulties	 and	 could	 trigger	 a	 series	 of	 con-
flicts	within	 Ukraine	 and	 in	 Ukrainian-Russian 
4	 For	more	 details	 see	 T.A.	 Olszański,	 ‘The	 fight	 for	 ca-
nonical	 independence	 for	 Ukrainian	 Orthodoxy’,	OSW 
Commentary,	 13.06.2018,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-13/fight-canoni-
cal-independence-ukrainian-orthodoxy-0 
relations. Two structures of equal status and 
similar	 strength	 will	 co-exist	 in	 Ukraine	 (in	
terms of the number of dioceses, although the 
UOC has the upper hand with respect to the 
number of parishes), and there is mutual hos-
tility between the two. The PCU and the UOC 
will	both	enjoy	strong	support	–	first	one	from	
Kyiv, the second one – from Moscow. This only 
makes	 them	 likely	 to	 be	 used	 in	 instrumental	
fashion for political purposes. Thus, in addition 
to a gradual move of UOC faithful to the new 
structure, the two structures can be expect-
ed to fortify their current positions and try to 
draw faithful to their side. This scenario, which 
becomes	 more	 likely	 the	 closer	 the	 elections	
get,	could	not	only	destabilise	Ukraine	further	
but also be a pretext for Russia to escalate its 
strong-arm	measures	against	Ukraine.	
While it should be possible for the KP UOC and 
UAOC structures to be transferred without seri-
ous	difficulties,	the	key	question	will	be	drawing	
as many UOC bishops, priests, and faithful to 
the autocephalous church as possible. The fact 
that the council meeting was only attended by 
two UOC bishops and in the past the notion of 
autocephaly was supported by ten, could mean 
at present that pressure on the part of the 
Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church has 
a greater effect than the PCU’s power to attract. 
Although,	once	the	official	process	of	granting	
autocephaly is completed, some adherents can 
be expected to move to the new church, at the 
moment it is hard to predict how many will 
do so. Moreover, at the moment the PCU will 
rely predominantly on the former Kyiv Patriar-
chate, which will probably hamper the process 
of drawing UOC bishops and priests to the new 
church, at least during the lifetime of Honoura-
A key question will be drawing as many 
UOC faithful, priests, and bishops to the au-
tocephalous church.
OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 289 5
ble Patriarch Filaret (for many, this person is the 
rock	of	offence).	On	the	other	hand,	for	some	
time there has been information about various 
kinds	of	pressure	being	exerted	by	the	Ukrain-
ian local authorities on individual UOC bishops 
and priests to draw them to the new church. 
This pressure should not be expected to abate.
The situation regarding sympathy among the 
faithful	 in	 what	 was	 the	 ‘Moscow’	 UOC	 re-
mains unclear, especially as currently no opinion 
polls can be considered credible. Earlier surveys 
showed	that	following	the	breakout	of	war	with	
Russia, some of the orthodox faithful changed 
from the UOC to the KP UOC for patriotic rea-
sons.	In	Ukraine,	there	was	(and	probably	still	is)	
a	large	group	of	people	who	are	simply	‘ortho-
dox’ worshippers, who ignore the split between 
the orthodox churches or who do not under-
stand	it.	The	attitude	of	these	‘culture	orthodox’	
believers will be important. These are people 
whose	 religious	affiliation	 is	primarily	or	 solely	
an element of their social identity, while matters 
of sacrament are less important. In these new 
circumstances, the patriotic faithful can be ex-
pected to change to the new church, and the 
anti-patriotic (anti-Kyiv) faithful to concentrate 
(and	become	active)	in	the	‘old’	church.
During	 the	 process	 of	 building	 the	 unified	
church, use of religious premises will be a cru-
cial issue, especially in towns where there is 
only one orthodox church, and also with re-
spect to a church that has special spiritual sig-
nificance.	It	is	almost	certain	that	there	will	be	
disputes	and	conflicts	enflamed	by	supporters	
of	rival	political	groups	and	Russian	agents	alike	
(especially in regard to highly important sites). 
The	importance	of	Ukrainian	orthodox	commu-
nities, consciously wishing to preserve the rela-
tionship with the Moscow Patriarchate, should 
also not be underestimated. These will be clus-
tered around all the large monasteries, most 
of which are pro-Moscow, and Metropolitan 
Agatangel of Odessa, as well as oligarchs and 
the Opposition Bloc and lay orthodox activist, 
Vadim	Novinsky.
These problems will have to be resolved by the 
secular	 authorities,	 since	 under	 the	 Ukrainian	
Law on Religious Belief of 1991 the state’s sole 
partner	 is	 local	 ‘communities	 of	 the	 faithful’	
(parishes,	 communities	 of	 monks,	 curia,	 and	
other institutions), while churches as such are 
not recognised as legal entities. Meanwhile, all 
religious premises are owned by the state (the 
status of premises constructed after 1991 is not 
clear)	and	the	state	authorities	can	make	them	
available for use by the faithful. This gives the 
authorities,	especially	 local	authorities,	signifi-
cant potential for exerting pressure. Attempts 
to	take	over	UPC	churches	by	force	can	also	be	
expected. At times these will be provocations 
on the part of Russia in nationalist organisa-
tions, at times their own measures, and at times 
measures aimed at disinformation5.
The fate of two lavras (monasteries of special 
spiritual	rank),	Pochayiv	and	Kyiv-Pechersk,	will	
be particularly important. Both are controlled by 
supporters of the radically pro-Russian ortho-
doxy.	In	both	cases,	in	recent	weeks,	measures	
have been seen that show that Kyiv is putting 
pressure on lavra leadership. The location of the 
Pechersk	lavra	in	the	city	centre	makes	it	sensi-
tive.	Activities	of	any	kind	centred	around	it	will	
take	place	with	 the	world	 (journalists	but	also	
diplomats) watching, and therefore any provo-
cation there will have major repercussions. 
Odessa might also become a hotspot in 
the coming months. Odessa is not so much 
5	 Information	disseminated	on	15	December,	saying	that	
an	unidentified	group	had	occupied	the	UOC	cathedral	
church in Vinnytsia (which was dispersed after a few 
minutes), could be a foretaste of what is to come.
During the process of building the unified 
church, disputes will arise over the use of 
religious premises. These will have to be 
resolved by the secular authorities.
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APPENDIX
Biography of Epiphanius, Metropolitan of Kyiv and the whole of Ukraine
Metropolitan	Epiphanius	was	born	Serhii	Dumenko	on	3	February	1979	 in	the	district	of	Odessa,	
but moved as a small child to Chernivtsi, where he lived in a rural area in the county of Storozhy-
nets.	 In	1996	 the	 joined	 the	UOC	KP	 seminary	 in	Kyiv.	He	 completed	a	doctorate	 in	 theology	 in	
2003	and	studied	philosophy	at	the	University	of	Athens	in	2006–2007,	later	becoming	a	lecturer	
at	Kyiv	Theological	Academy.	In	2007	he	was	ordained	as	a	monk,	he	took	holy	orders	and	became	
a priest in 2008, and was made a bishop in 2009. In 2008 he became secretary to Patriarch Filaret, 
in	2010	he	was	appointed	Dean	of	the	Kyiv	Theological	Academy,	in	2012	he	became	Metropolitan	
of	Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky	and	Boryspil,	and	in	June	2013	–	viceroy	and	locum tenens to Patriarch 
Filaret, with right of succession. This was due to a decision made by the UOC KP synod not to elect 
a	new	patriarch	following	the	death	of	Filaret	(in	order	to	aid	the	unification	of	Ukrainian	ortho-
doxy). Metropolitan Epiphanius therefore became the de facto leader of the Kyiv Patriarchate UOC. 
Filaret	undoubtedly	selected	Epiphanius	for	his	outstanding	skills,	and	as	a	trustworthy	figure.	
Metropolitan	Epiphanius	is	a	theologian	and	academic	lecturer.	He	speaks	Greek	and	has	written	
approximately 50 academic articles. His rapid career meant that in the meantime he did not gain 
any	experience	doing	pastoral	work	(he	has	never	been	a	parish	priest	or	bishop	of	a	diocese).	He	
represents	a	new	generation	of	Ukrainian	priests.	When	he	finished	secondary	school,	Ukraine	was	
independent and so he is not tarnished by the legacy of the Soviet attitude to churches – (including 
the	actions	of	the	KGB	in	this	area).	His	few	interviews	reveal	that	he	is	in	favour	of	Ukraine’s	integra-
tion with Europe and a radical severing of the ties still connecting the	Ukrainian	state	with Russia.
pro-Russian as anti-Kyiv, and is particularly 
hostile	 towards	 the	 current	 Ukrainian	 powers	
and susceptible to provocations on the part 
of	 agents	working	 to	 spread	Moscow’s	 prop-
aganda	 and	 influence.	 It	 is	 the	 seat	 of	 the	
above-mentioned Metropolitan Agatangel. For 
the time being it is not clear how Moscow will 
react to the council’s decisions, in particular de-
priving Metropolitan Onufry of the title of Met-
ropolitan of Kyiv and the expected revocation 
by	the	Ukrainian	authorities	of	the	right	to	use	
the	name	of	the	Ukrainian	Orthodox	Church	by	
the	structures,	not	unified	into	the	new	church. 
Russia	 will	 certainly	 try	 to	 enflame	 the	 con-
flicts	that	are	emerging	and	provoke	new	ones. 
Text finalised on the morning of December 17.
